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Abstract. Negotiations are an important way of reaching agreements between
selfish autonomous agents. In this paper we focus on one-to-many bargaining
within the context of agent-mediated electronic commerce. We consider an ap-
proach where a seller negotiates over multiple interdependent attributes with
many buyers individually. Bargaining is conducted in a bilateral fashion, using
an alternating-offers protocol. In such a one-to-many setting, “fairness,” which
corresponds to the notion of envy-freeness in auctions, may be an important busi-
ness constraint. For the case of virtually unlimited supply (such as information
goods), we present a number of one-to-many bargaining strategies for the seller,
which take into account the fairness constraint, and consider multiple attributes
simultaneously. We compare the performance of the bargaining strategies using
an evolutionary simulation, especially for the case of impatient buyers and small
premature bargaining break off probability. Several of the developed strategies
are able to extract almost all the surplus; they utilize the fact that the setting is
one-to-many, even though bargaining occurs in a bilateral fashion.
1 Introduction
It is common to characterize negotiations by their setting: bilateral, one-to-many, or
many-to-many. In this paper we focus on the one-to-many bargaining setting, where a
seller agent negotiates, on behalf of a seller, with many buyers individually in a bilateral
fashion. We develop various strategies for this setting which enable a seller agent to
bargain over multiple interdependent issues simultaneously and effectively.
In many cases, auctions can be used to effectively organize one-to-many bargain-
ing. Depending on the setting, auctions can provide buyers with the incentive to reveal
their preferences truthfully, and to allocate the goods efficiently. For various situations,
however, auctions may not be the preferred protocol to bargainers. In situations of, for
example, virtually unlimited supply, multiple issues, continuous sale, and/or repeated
sales to the same buyers the appropriate auction protocol becomes, at best, much more
complex. Consequently, businesses may opt for the intuitive and flexible bilateral bar-
gaining protocol, where the seller agent negotiates bilaterally with one or more buyers
simultaneously by exchanging offers and counter offers. In many electronic commerce
domains supply is flexible and new goods can be reproduced quickly, at relatively low
costs; especially in these domains businesses may opt for a bilateral bargaining protocol.
The sales of information goods, with its virtually unlimited supply, provide a particu-
larly good example of an application domain where businesses may opt for bilateral
bargaining.
Potentially, bargaining can lead to unsatisfied customers if buyers perceive the out-
comes of the negotiations as unfair. This can occur when, for instance, two customers
obtain similar goods at the same time but end up paying very different amounts. Fair-
ness of negotiation outcomes is important for customer satisfaction, which in turn may
be important for a business’ long term profitability. The seller agent can prevent unfair
outcomes by incorporating a fairness norm, comparable to the notion of envy-freeness
in auctions [1], whereby customers are treated in a similar fashion. This fairness aspect
emphasizes that bargaining is really one-to-many.
The challenge is to develop bargaining strategies for the seller agent that maximize
overall revenue by utilizing differences in buyers’ willingness to pay without violating
the fairness constraint. In this paper we focus on strategies that can utilize differences in
customers’ time pressure. For the case of virtually unlimited supply, as for information
goods, we present a number of one-to-many bargaining strategies for the seller, which
take into account the fairness constraint and bargain over multiple attributes. In order to
benefit from time pressure, these strategies specify—in addition to an actual (counter)
proposal or an acceptance proposal—when to respond to an opponent’s proposal. We
compare the performance of the bargaining strategies using an evolutionary simulation,
especially for the case of impatient buyers and small (exogenous) probability (per ne-
gotiation round) of a customer breaking off the negotiations. One set of strategies, the
so-called “responsive threshold” strategies, are able to extract almost all the surplus,
given sufficient time pressure. These strategies benefit from the fact that the setting
is one-to-many, even though bargaining occurs in a bilateral fashion. In addition, the
strategies are able to find win-win agreements (i.e., very little Pareto improvement is
possible).
A number of related papers study bargaining using an evolutionary approach,
e.g. [2–5]. Our approach extends previous research to multiple (types of) buyers and
bilateral negotiation strategies for one-to-many multi-issue bargaining which can ben-
efit from time pressure. In addition a growing body of literature exists on multi-issue
negotiation, which focus on developing techniques a seller and/or a buyer can use to
determine the relative magnitude of the various issues and consequently search for ap-
proximately win-win (or Pareto-efficient) deals [6–9]. Although we also consider the
problem of how to determine the values for the various attributes of an offer, the focus
of the paper lies on the development of “threshold” strategies for one-to-many negoti-
ation. These strategies determine the desired utility level of a deal and can be used in
conjunction with the techniques already developed in the literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the
bargaining setting and introduce strategies for one-to-many bargaining. In Section 3 we
discuss the simulation environment used for testing the performance of the strategies.
We present the simulation results of the conducted computer experiments in Section 4.
Conclusions follow in Section 5.
2 One-to-Many Bargaining
2.1 Fairness
An agent representing a business can be endowed with various bargaining strategies.
The bargaining outcome should, however, be fair. Because fairness must be ensured
by the seller and because buyer preferences are private, we define fairness as follows.
Suppose at time td a buyer reaches a deal. We say that this deal is fair, relative to a fixed
interval ∆ > 0, whenever there exist a start time ts, with td ∈ [ts, ts + ∆], such that
the seller is indifferent between any other deal reached within the interval [ts, ts +∆].
Whenever price is the only issue, a buyer does not strictly prefer any deal for which
the seller is indifferent. In this case, we can give the following equivalent definition: a
deal is fair, relative to a fixed interval ∆ > 0, whenever there exist a start time ts, with
td ∈ [ts, ts + ∆], such that the buyer does not strictly prefer any other deal which is
reached within the interval [ts, ts + ∆]. Note, that this definition of fairness is closely
related to the notion of envy-free auctions in [1]; it adapts the notion of envy-freeness
to the more continuous setting of bilateral bargaining.
2.2 Bargaining Protocol
The seller agent negotiates with many buyer agents simultaneously in a bilateral fashion
by alternating offers and counter offers. An offer specifies a value for each attribute of
the negotiation, such as the price, quality, quantity, and other relevant aspects. The pro-
tocol allows for multiple offers to be submitted simultaneously. Exchanging multiple
offers can improve the (Pareto) efficiency of agreements made when several attributes
are concerned. An offer constitutes a Pareto improvement over another offer whenever it
makes one bargainer better off without making the other worse off. A bargainer propos-
ing multiple offers can be indifferent between those offers whereas his opponent may
prefer a particular offer and can improve efficiency by selecting this offer.
We call the set of offers combined with the preconditions a proposal. A bargainer
can accept one of the submitted offers or reject all offers and place a counter proposal.
Negotiations between a buyer and seller agent proceed to the next round whenever a
proposal is submitted and terminates when one of the submitted offers is accepted or
after a predefined period of time has elapsed. Note that a bargainer can introduce a delay
before submitting a counter proposal. The duration of a round varies depending on the
delay. Figure 1 depicts the alternating offer bargaining protocol.
2.3 Time Pressure
An important assumption is that buyers are impatient and prefer an early agreement.
Time pressure or time impatience is a common assumption in bargaining, e.g. [10].
The seller agent is simultaneously and continuously negotiating with many buyers and
is therefore less concerned with immediately reaching an agreement for a particular
bargaining outcome, i.e., he is relatively patient. We model this relative time patience
by assuming that the seller, unlike the buyers, has no direct time pressure: i.e., the
seller is indifferent between selling now and later. In the experiments we do, however,
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Fig. 1. The agents’ bargaining protocol
consider a small exogenous probability (per negotiation round) of a customer breaking
off the negotiation process; therefore the seller has an indirect incentive to speed up the
negotiations (all else equal).
At least in theory, the seller can benefit from buyers’ time-pressure by introducing
a delay before submitting a counter proposal. An important question is then which
bargaining strategies can most effectively utilize these potential benefits. Experimental
results discussed in Section 4 show that responsive threshold strategies, which we will
discuss in the next Section, are very effective: depending on the time pressure, they are
capable of extracting very large shares of the seller surplus. (Reasoned from the seller’s
perspective the surplus is just the maximum utility he can realize by selling the goods
or services.)
2.4 One-to-Many Bargaining Strategies
The challenge is to develop bargaining strategies for the seller agent that maximize
overall revenue by utilizing differences in buyers’ willingness to pay without violating
the fairness constraint. Instead, these strategies utilize differences indirectly through
buyers’ time pressure. In order to benefit from time pressure, a strategy specifies, in
addition to an actual (counter) proposal or an acceptance proposal, when to respond to
an opponent’s proposal.
The seller strategies as developed determine the offers of a proposal in two steps.
First, they specify a threshold level which sets the utility level of the offers. Second,
they generate the values for the individual attributes, given the threshold. Advanced
techniques for multi-issue negotiation, such as discussed in [6–9], can be applied to the
latter. The focus of this paper is on effective strategies for determining the threshold;
we therefore only consider the relatively simple technique of randomly determining the
attribute-values given a threshold. The probability with which a value of an attribute is
determined may however depend on a buyer’s corresponding offer (see below).
Besides specifying the utility of a (counter) proposal, the threshold is also used to
determine when to respond to an outstanding proposal. More precisely, a seller strategy
responds with a fixed delay to all outstanding proposals which lie below the (current)
threshold value; a proposal lies below the threshold value whenever the seller’s utility
for all offers in the proposal lies below the threshold value. While applying a delay to
all proposals below the threshold value, the seller agent continues to negotiate with the
remaining buyers by immediately responding with a counter proposal.
This negotiation without delay with the select group of buyers can, in principle, con-
tinue for several rounds. During these rounds the threshold is not adjusted. The goal at
this time is to improve the Pareto-efficiency of the final agreement by finding mutually
beneficial trade offs between the various attributes. In the simulation the seller agent
only makes a single proposal to improve the efficiency of the deal. For a particular pro-
posal of a buyer the seller strategy randomly generates offers within the neighborhood
of the buyer’s best offers, i.e., with the highest utility for the seller. This already suffices
for very efficient outcomes. If a buyer does not accept one of the seller agent’s offers,
the seller agent will again respond with delay.
Another aspect that needs to be considered by the seller agent is the fairness of the
agreements. Fairness prescribes that the seller should be indifferent between the deals
made within the defined time interval. Whenever the seller agent almost simultaneously
accepts two different offers a bargaining outcome may be unfair. The seller strategy
ensures fairness by always making a (interesting) counter proposal, instead of accept-
ing an offer directly. The seller agent can be equipped with a number of strategies for
determining the threshold, which we introduce below.
Fixed and Time-Dependent Threshold Strategies For purpose of comparison we in-
troduce a fixed threshold strategy. Clearly, the fixed threshold strategy is not capable of
utilizing buyers’ time pressure. The purpose of the strategy is to provide some insights
in the minimal extractable profit, given strategic behavior of the buyers.
The second strategy we consider is a time-dependent threshold strategy: the current
utility or threshold depends on time. The threshold only changes from one period to
the next. Unlike the fixed-threshold strategy the time-dependent strategy is capable of
utilizing buyers’ time pressure. Its success, however, depends on how much it knows
about buyers’ preferences, or how easily more about buyers’ preferences can be learned,
in relation to time-based pricing strategies.
Responsive Threshold Strategies The fixed and time-dependent threshold strategies
do not adjust the threshold based on the buyers’ offers. Inspired by the first-price auc-
tion, we introduce another type of bargaining strategy with a responsive threshold. With
this strategy, all offers submitted by the buyers within a certain fixed time interval are
collected after the previous offers made by the seller agent. Then it determines the cur-
rent highest utility, which is equal to the utility of the best offer from the collection of
offers. The threshold is set to the current highest utility.
The success of the responsive threshold strategy does not depend on some (a pri-
ori) knowledge of buyer preferences, unlike the fixed and time-dependent strategies.
Intuitively, buyers who— due to time pressure— suffer more from delay are inclined
to bargain less “hard-headed” than other buyers. Consequently, these buyers may reach
a deal sooner and pay a higher price. Thus, at least potentially, the strategy is capa-
ble of utilizing buyers’ time pressure without requiring (a priori) knowledge of buyer
preferences. Unlike auctions, actual bargaining occurs in an alternating exchange of of-
fers and counter offers, typically initiated by a buyer. Parties bargain over the price and
other relevant aspects of the provided good or service. Even though the seller agent’s
strategy can be auction-inspired, buyers will be unaware of this fact. They do not know
the opponent’s bargaining strategy on forehand; they perceive the bargaining process as
bilateral. Buyers may of course suspect some relationship with other ongoing negotia-
tions. The point is that unlike a true auction the relationship with other simultaneously
submitted offers is not specified up front, through a set of rules.
Reservation Value A drawback of the responsive threshold strategy is that it becomes
vulnerable whenever groups of buyers experience very little time pressure. Without
time pressure buyers have no incentive to buy soon. They may all independently decide
to initially submit very low offers; consequently utility will be very low for the seller.
To circumvent this we also consider responsive threshold strategies with a reservation
value. A seller agent is never willing to sell below the reservation value. This means we
alter the earlier definition of the current highest utility. It now becomes the maximum
of the reservation value and the best offer from the offers collected within a certain
time interval. An interesting advantages of introducing a reservation value occurs when
some but not all buyers experience very little time-pressure. The responsive threshold
strategy can then still utilize the time-pressure of the other buyers.
We consider two approaches for determining the reservation value. Either the reser-
vation value is fixed, like the fixed-threshold strategy, or it is time dependent, like the
time-dependent threshold strategy. Thus the responsive threshold strategy with a reser-
vation value is actually a combination of the responsive threshold strategy (without
reservation value) and either the fixed or time-dependent strategies.
3 Bargaining Simulation Environment
We apply a simulation environment in order to evaluate the performance and robust-
ness of the above negotiation strategies against many learning buyers. The agents in
the simulation are assumed to be boundedly rational: they can learn and adapt their
strategies by a process of trial and error, and they do not know the seller’s strategy.
The bargaining process is repeated many times, enabling buyers and the seller to learn
from past interactions. An evolutionary algorithm is used to model the learning aspect
of the agents. This is a common approach within the field of agent-based computational
economics (ACE) [11]. A number of related papers study bargaining using an evolu-
tionary approach, e.g. [2–5]. Our approach extends previous research to multiple (types
of) buyers and bilateral negotiation strategies for one-to-many multi-issue bargaining
which can benefit from time pressure.
3.1 The Bargaining Game
The seller agent negotiates with many buyer agents simultaneously by alternating offers
and counter offers as described in Section 2.2, where the buyer agents initiate the ne-
gotiations. For our simulations we set a maximum number of n discrete periods, where
n is set sufficiently large such that it has no significant impact on the results. For the
analysis we assume that offers consist of two interdependent attributes, e.g. the price
and the quality. We note that buyer agents in the simulation may leave the negotiations
prematurely (due to a bargaining break off probability) but do not enter later. We also
assume that, since buyers are impatient, buyer agents in the simulation will respond to
the seller agent’s counter offers without delay. This is modeled by having the buyer’s
counter proposal or acceptance proposal occur in the same period as the seller’s pro-
posal.
3.2 Buyers and their Agents
Buyers are interested in buying at most one good in each bargaining game. They can
have different preferences regarding the time pressure and attribute value combinations,
which together constitute the buyer type. For the analysis we assume a finite number
of k types. Although k is fixed, the number of participating buyer agents of each type
varies randomly for each negotiation game and is determined independently by a Pois-
son distribution with average λ.
To illustrate the feasibility of our approach for interdependent attributes, we use the
well-known Cobb-Douglas utility function to represent a player’s preferences for the
two attributes. More specifically, the utility ui for buyer type i in case of a disagreement
equals zero and in case of an agreement ui is defined as
ui = (v1,i − o1)αi(v2,i − o2)βiδti ,
where αi and βi are parameters that indicate the relative importance of the attributes; o1
and o2 are the negotiated values the seller receives for the attributes (and the buyer has
to give in); and v1,i and v2,i represent the maximum buyer i’s is willing to give in on the
individual attributes. For example, let attribute 1 and 2 refer to price and quality. Then o1
represents the price and o2 the difference between the maximum quality and the actual
quality of the good received; v1,i then represents the maximum price buyer i is willing
to pay and v2,i the maximum buyer i is willing to give in on the quality. Furthermore, δi
is the discount factor used to model the time pressure, and t is the negotiation time. In
the simulation depreciation occurs at discrete time intervals. Therefore, δ is the discrete
representation of time pressure and t indicates the period in which an agreement is
reached. Note that discount factors are commonly used for modeling time pressure, e.g.
in the Rubinstein-Sta˚hl alternating-offers model [10].
Buyer Agent’s Strategy The buyer agents in the simulation apply time-dependent strate-
gies similar to the seller’s time-dependent threshold strategy described in Section 2.4.
The buyer agent also uses an analogous (random) strategy for determining the values of
the attributes given the threshold. The time-dependent strategy consists of a piece-wise
linear function to determine the threshold. The parameters that determine the function
are adaptive: using an evolutionary algorithm they evolve such that the performance of
the strategy increases.
We also applied an extended strategy in our experiments by using two separate
piece-wise linear functions: one produces the threshold for determining the utility level
of the offers and the other function determines the threshold for accepting or rejecting
the seller’s offers. The separation of the two functions enhances the bargaining capa-
bilities of the buyer agent. Results using the two representations are very similar. The
outcomes presented in this paper are based on the extended strategy.
3.3 Seller Agent
The seller agent bargains with a number of buyers simultaneously, without knowing
the type of these buyers. The seller agent’s utility in case of an agreement equals us =
oαs1 o
βs
2 , and is zero in case of a disagreement (recall from Section 2.3 that the we can
assume the seller has no time pressure). The total utility equals the sum of utilities
obtained over all buyers. Production costs are set to zero.
We consider five strategies for the seller agent: fixed threshold, time-based thresh-
old, responsive threshold and two combined strategies (see also Section 2.4). The time-
based threshold strategy is similar to the strategy used by the buyer. The first two
strategies and the combined strategies have parameters which determine respectively
the threshold value and the reservation value during a bargaining game. These parame-
ters are adaptive: optimal values are learned using an evolutionary algorithm, explained
below. The responsive threshold strategy does not have any parameters that need to be
learned.
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3.4 The Evolutionary Algorithm
Evolutionary algorithms (EAs) are a class of search algorithms inspired by Darwin’s
theory on variation and natural selection, and are becoming increasingly popular for
modeling economic behavior, particularly within the field of agent-based computational
economics (ACE), see e.g. [11]. We use an implementation based on “evolution strate-
gies” [12], which is typical for real-valued encoding of the strategies (whereas the more
popular branch of “genetic algorithms” is originally based on binary encoding).
The EAs are used to produce effective bargaining strategies for the buyer agents.
Strategies for the agents of different buyer types are produced by separate EAs, which
operate in parallel. This allows for heterogeneous strategies to emerge. Furthermore, in
case of an adaptive seller agent, a separate EA is also used to produce strategies for the
seller agent. A graphical representation of the evolutionary simulation with two buyer
types and an adaptive seller agent is given in Fig. 2.
Each EA starts with a population of parent strategies, which are randomly gener-
ated. The EA then performs the following cycle to improve the quality or fitness of the
strategies. First, the reproduction operator generates a population of offspring strategies
by randomly selecting strategies from the parent population and slightly mutating the
strategy to obtain variation.
In the next step, the fitness of the strategies is determined by the average utility
obtained in a number of bargaining games. At the start of each bargaining game, the
number of participating buyers of each type is determined randomly using a Poisson
distribution as described above. Buyer agents are then generated for each buyer and are
assigned a randomly selected strategy from either the parent or offspring population of
the corresponding type. Similarly, a strategy is selected randomly for the seller agent
(in case of an adaptive seller). The bargaining game is played for a fixed number of
times, determining the number of buyers and assigning new strategies at the start of
each game.
In the final stage of the cycle, a deterministic selection scheme called (µ + λ)-
selection chooses the strategies with the highest fitness from both the parents and the
offspring populations as the new parents for the next generation [12]. The cycle is re-
peated for a fixed number of generations.
Strategy encoding As mentioned in Section 3.2, the buyer agent’s strategy consists
of two piece-wise linear functions: an offer and a threshold function. The functions are
encoded using real values, where each bending point of a function is encoded by two
real values (i.e., the period and the corresponding threshold value). Additionally, two
end points mark the values for the first and last period. For example, 8 real values are
needed to encode a pair of functions with two line pieces each.
The same representation is used for the seller agent if he uses a time-based thresh-
old strategy. If a fixed threshold is used, only a single real value is needed to encode
this. Note that the seller agent uses the same function for both the threshold and for
producing offers.
Mutation with Exponential Decay The mutation operator changes the strategy of an
agent as follows. Each real value xi is mutated by adding a zero-mean Gaussian variable
with a standard deviation σ [12]: x′i := xi + σNi(0, 1). All resulting values larger than
unity (or smaller than zero) are set to unity (respectively zero). In our simulations,
we use a model of exponentially decaying standard deviations. This approach ensures
convergence and is analogous to simulated annealing, where a temperature parameter
determines the variation of the solution. A half-life parameter determines the number
of generations that the mutation standard changes to half the value.
4 Experimental Results
4.1 Settings
In this paper we report on two series of experiments with either a 0% or a 1% exogenous
customer break off probability: a break off probability of 1% means that at every new
round there is a 1% probability of an active customer breaking off (or leaving) the
current bargaining game. The following settings are used for both series of experiments.
(We note that also experiments are carried out using other settings, e.g. with a different
number of participating buyers and buyer valuations, resulting in very similar outcomes,
but are omitted due to space limitations.) Buyers are grouped into three types (k = 3),
each type having adaptive bargaining strategies evolving in separate populations. The
time pressure (discount factor) for each type is set as a control parameter. The values
v1,i and v2,i, and the parameters αi and βi are randomly generated from a uniform
distribution at the beginning of each experiment, such that v1,i, v2,i ∈ [100, 300] and
αi, βi ∈ [0.7, 0.9]. A buyer furthermore has a minimum threshold value, which is a
minimum acceptable utility and is fixed at 10% of the most favourable utility (i.e., the
utility ui when o1 = o2 = 0, see Section 3.2).
The piece-wise linear functions of the buyer agents, and of the seller agent in case
of time-based threshold strategy, consist of two line pieces. The number of buyers of
each type participating in a bargaining game is determined randomly by a Poisson dis-
tribution with the average λ = 10. Buyers and sellers produce 3 offers in each round,
which are randomly selected given a threshold value. However, when the seller pro-
duces counter offers without delay to improve Pareto efficiency (see Section 2.4), the
seller generates 5 offers in the vicinity of the buyer’s best offers. The length of a bar-
gaining game is set to 40 periods.
The EA settings are chosen such that results are robust and the EAs are able to find
good solutions. All buyer types use equal settings, with 20 strategies in the parent pop-
ulations and 20 offspring strategies. The mutation standard deviation (see Section3.4)
is initially set to 0.2, and decays with a half-life value of 50 generations. The EA set-
tings for the seller are the same, except that each seller population only contains 10
strategies. Buyers have larger populations because more buyers than sellers participate
each game, and because in case of the extended buyer strategy (with two functions) the
search space for the buyer is larger (a higher population size is often recommended for
larger search spaces). The fitness of the strategies for a single generation is determined
by 100 bargaining games. For these settings the EAs are able to find almost optimal
solutions for simple test cases.
4.2 Results
The results reported in this Section are obtained after a process of learning, when the
strategies have converged. It is important to note that, during learning, the preferences
of the buyers remain unchanged, although the number and composition (i.e., number of
each type) of buyers can differ in each bargaining game. Experiments are run for 40000
bargaining games (400 generations). Results are averaged over the last 1000 bargaining
games of an experiment, and over 30 experiments, accounting for random settings such
as the number of participating buyers and the buyer’s preferences.
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0.8 0.82 0.84 0.86 0.88 0.9 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98 1
m
ea
n
 fr
ac
tio
n 
se
lle
r s
ur
pl
us
buyer discount factor
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0.8 0.82 0.84 0.86 0.88 0.9 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98 1
buyer discount factor
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4) (5)
Fig. 3. Seller’s obtained fraction of total surplus, with (a) 0% (on the left) and (b) 1% (on the
right) break off probability, using 5 threshold strategies: (1) fixed threshold, (2) time-dependent
threshold, (3) responsive threshold, (4) combined (3) and (1), and (5) combined (3) and (2).
Figure 3 compares—for a break off probability of (a) 0% (on the left) and (b) 1% (on
the right)—the obtained fraction of the total seller surplus for different seller threshold
strategies and buyer discount factors (buyers have equal discount factors). We define
the seller surplus of a bilateral negotiation as the seller’s maximum feasible utility, i.e.,
when the buyer offers her minimum threshold value and the offer is Pareto-efficient.
As shown in Fig. 3, the fixed threshold strategy (1) is able to extract around 75% of
the seller surplus. The outcomes are relatively independent of the break off probability;
this is because almost all deals will be closed in the first or second round (the average
round of agreement lies between 0.14 and 0.24 in case of time pressure). Note that these
outcomes are independent of the discount factor. Clearly, the fixed threshold strategy is
unable to benefit from the buyers’ time pressure.
The time-based threshold strategy (2), on the other hand, shows that higher profits
can be obtained if the threshold changes over time, see Fig. 3a. Buyers with a high valu-
ation will purchase relatively early, since waiting for a better deal does not compensate
the loss due to time discounting. Buyers with a low valuation, on the other hand, have
the incentive to reach an agreement in a later stage if they can get a better price for
it. This way the seller can indirectly discriminate between buyers with different valua-
tions and time pressures. The performance of the time-based threshold strategy (2) is,
however, vulnerable to an increase in the bargaining break off probability (see Fig. 3b).
Note that with no time discounting (i.e., when δ = 1) the fixed threshold strategy
performs better. This is due to the difference in strategy complexity: only a single value
needs to be optimized in case of a fixed threshold, whereas an entire function (encoded
by 4 values) needs to be learned in case of the time-based threshold. This is clearly
more difficult, especially within a dynamic environment with learning buyers.
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and (b) 1% (on the right) break off probability. The numbers correspond to the seller threshold
strategies in Fig. 3.
Outcomes using the responsive threshold bargaining strategies (see Fig. 3 (3),(4),
and (5)) show an impressive increase in the fraction of surplus when buyers are impa-
tient. If the time pressure becomes sufficiently high, the seller obtains almost the entire
surplus. Even for lower time pressure, results are much better for the seller compared
to the fixed and time-based threshold strategies. The consequence of increasing the bar-
gaining break off probability from 0% to 1% is that buyers’ time pressure needs to
be a bit higher before the threshold strategies will dominated the other strategies and
the maximal attainable performance drops a bit. This drop in performance is, however,
mainly caused by lower sales due to the premature departure of customers; thus the
seller’s bargaining position does not change fundamentally.
For the case of no or very low time pressure, the results also show that simple
auction-like mechanisms such as the responsive threshold strategy are not sufficient in
case of unlimited supply. Without competition between buyers, the market price goes
to cost level, resulting in a zero surplus for the seller. This problem can be resolved by
combining the responsive threshold strategy with an adaptive reserve value. As shown
in Fig. 3, this results in very good outcomes, even if buyers are very patient. This makes
the combined strategy very versatile. We note that these outcomes also generalize to
settings where buyer types have different time preferences, assuming that buyers with
higher valuation have a higher time pressure. The outcomes are not shown here due to
space limitations.
The mean (in)efficiency of the obtained bargaining results is depicted in Fig. 4. The
inefficiency is measured as the seller’s maximum Pareto-improvement of a given out-
come divided by the seller’s actual utility plus the improvement. The outcomes show
low inefficiencies for all strategies (the highest inefficiency is around 2.7% of the total
utility). However, the responsive threshold strategies result in relatively the most Pareto-
efficient deals. Unlike the other strategies, the responsive strategies set the threshold ex-
actly to the best offer. Since this is the buyer’s best offer, it is already quite efficient. In
case of the other strategies, however, the utility of the offers usually exceed the seller’s
threshold, and the seller first needs to map the buyer’s offers to the right utility level
when making counter offers. This mapping results in additional inefficiencies of the
outcomes. Even with a reasonably simple strategy for determining the relative magni-
tude of the attribute values, already good results are found. The Pareto-efficiency is ex-
pected to improve even further by incorporating more advanced strategies as described
in e.g. [7, 6, 8, 9]. This is however left for future work.
4.3 Bargaining Revisited
A possible strategy of the buyer agent is to bid very low, and then accept the counter
offer of the seller. Such a strategy could be beneficial in case the seller’s counter of-
fer is influenced by the buyers’ offers, as with the responsive threshold strategies. This
could then result in low profits for the seller. To see if indeed buyers benefit from such a
strategy, the strategy representation for buyers was extended by using two separate func-
tions: one produces the threshold for determining the utility level of the offers and the
other function determines the threshold for accepting or rejecting the seller’s offers (see
Section 3.2). Even with separated function, however, the responsive threshold strategy
performs very much in favor of the seller (as shown by the results). This occurs because
the counter offer is delayed by the seller whenever offers fall below the (seller’s) thresh-
old, hence providing the buyers with an incentive to try and get an agreement without
delay.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we consider strategies for a seller agent who negotiates with many buy-
ers simultaneously in a bilateral fashion over multiple interdependent attributes. These
strategies respect a notion of fairness such that buyers are treated similarly. An impor-
tant aspect of the developed strategies is their ability to benefit from impatient buyers
that prefer early agreements. Buyers can have different valuations and time preferences.
A buyer’s actual valuation and time preference is only known to himself (i.e., a buyer’s
type constitutes private information).
The strategies introduced determine three aspects: a threshold, multi-attribute offers
with a utility level corresponding to the threshold, and a scheme for determining when
to respond. Five different threshold strategies for the seller agent are evaluated and
compared: (1) fixed threshold, (2) time-dependent threshold strategies, (3) responsive,
(4) responsive with fixed reservation value, and (5) responsive with time-dependent
reservation value. The last two strategies are actually a combination of the responsive
threshold strategy with the first two strategies.
We use an evolutionary simulation to analyze the performance of the different strate-
gies when the buyers and seller bargain over two interdependent attributes. The buyers’
bargaining strategies adapt and learn through the use of an evolutionary algorithm (EA).
The seller’s strategies (1) and (2), and the combined strategies (4) and (5) also adapt and
learn using an EA. The responsive threshold strategy (3), on the other hand, determines
the threshold value based exclusively on the offers received by the buyers, and does not
require any learning.
The outcomes show that bilaterally exchanging multiple offers combined with a ran-
dom offer generation mechanism suffices for closely approximating Pareto-efficiency.
Furthermore, given a small probability (per negotiation round) of a customer breaking
of the negotiations the responsive threshold strategies appear to be very successful in
utilizing time pressure and consequently extract a very high share of the surplus. For
sufficiently high time pressure, the seller obtains almost all surplus, indicating that buy-
ers submit and/or accept offers close to their reservation value. Thus buyers self-select
to pay their valuation, while the bargaining outcomes respect our notion of fairness.
The results also show superior performance of the combined strategies (4 and 5) com-
pared to the auction-inspired strategy (3), in case some or all buyers have very little
time pressure. In other words, the combined strategy is very versatile.
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